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PROPERTY IN THE MORAL LIFE OF HUMAN BEINGS 
BY CHRISTOPHER BERTRAM 
NOTE: THIS IS THE “ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT” VERSION OF THIS PAPER, WHICH WILL APPEAR IN SOCIAL 





Property is a central concept in both political philosophy and everyday life. As we navi-
gate the social world, make plans and choices, and coordinate our actions with our fellow hu-
mans, we have to negotiate an invisible framework of rights, duties, and permissions that both 
enables and limits us. To navigate this landscape, we have to make reliable judgments about 
who or what can own a thing, what sort of things can be owned, who owns a particular thing, 
and about how that shapes possible actions both for us and for others. This is not trivial. After 
all, ownership is not an observable property of objects, it can be transferred without any change 
in the location or appearance of an object, and it can persist through changes in its location, size, 
color, and so forth. 
Yet, although this idea looks complex and seems to impose some heavy cognitive de-
mands on ordinary people, we are remarkably successful using it and  tracking its corresponding 
moral requirements. This is despite the fact that most people receive no formal instruction con-
cerning property and that the idea is often sketchily dealt with even in law books and works of 
philosophy. Unlike other abstract notions which are more or less useful in life — such as the 
truths and procedures of arithmetic — people seem to be pretty good at picking up and using 
property as a concept. They usually have a good intuitive grasp of the idea, even if they could 
not give an explicit account of it. In this respect, property resembles language. Just as the native 
speakers of a language enjoy a remarkable facility and competence with the grammar of that 
language without being able to give the account of it that an expert in linguistics would, so most 
 1
!people can find their way around the normative system that is property without sharing the per-
spective and understanding of that system that a philosopher or legal expert has.   1
This fact about property suggests either that there is an ability concerning property that 
is native to our species or that the ability to make property judgments supervenes on some other 
universally distributed native abilities, such as the capacity to make and conform with social 
rules more generally. If this is right, then it seems plausible that human beings have been en-
gaged in making such judgments for a very long time, and perhaps that these judgments are in-
terwoven with the capacities that make human sociality and cooperation possible. Yet such a 
view of property discrimination as a primitive capacity is in tension with another widely held 
position that takes systems of property to be entirely conventional and subject to deliberate 
choice and change. This alternative view holds that the very idea of property is conceptually 
dependent on the existence of institutions — states and legal systems — that have arisen only in 
recent historical time. If this view is right, and property is simply the creation of legislators and 
jurists, how are ordinary people as good with the concept as they are? 
One reason why these questions matter, but also why they are the subject of much con-
fusion and dispute, is that many people think there are significant political consequences that 
follow. Some (though not all) libertarians and classical liberals are keen to embrace a view that 
secures the status of private property as a pre-institutional natural right.    Conversely, some so2 -
cial democrats and egalitarian liberals seek to defend the idea that all property is a legal conven-
tion.   This is perhaps because they believe that such a conception makes it easier to justify ad3 -
justing property rights to achieve fair distributive outcomes. Not that this is a straight political 
divide between left and right. Given the close connection between the concepts of justice and 
property, people who see property and justice as entirely the creations of particular legal sys-
tems can thereby argue that cosmopolitan theories of global justice are confused.   Here I argue 4
that neither of these camps has things right. Property consists both in local conventions and in 
native capacities to navigate and use conventional systems; and property judgments plausibly 
include both culturally variable elements — concerning such matters as what can be owned — 
and human universals. 
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 Much of the confusion here stems from the fact that political philosophy all too often 
takes its account of human nature from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century debates and em-
braces a fairly crude distinction between the natural and the social. But modern research in 
fields including psychology, anthropology, and primatology tells us that we are by nature a so-
cial species with a natural capacity to devise and follow norms and with prosocial instincts to 
set alongside our pursuit of individual self-interest.     5
In what follows, I subject both the philosophical and social scientific bases of some 
modern conventionalist accounts of property to scrutiny. After some initial remarks concerning 
the concept of property and the interest served by the institution, I focus on a set of three argu-
ments employed by Kant (though some derive from Hobbes) that purport to show that the very 
notion of property is conceptually dependent on the state. These arguments include a mixture of 
philosophical and empirical claims concerning the nature and possibility of property that I sug-
gest are weaker than they might seem. In the second half of the essay I draw on modern work in 
social science and psychology — particularly recent findings from developmental psychology 
— to argue that there is good evidence that humans have the natural capacities to sustain and 
navigate an institution like property in the absence of state power; I then address the difficult 
question of the relevance of such purportedly natural facts about humans for the justification of 
a normative institution. In a final section I suggest a revised and somewhat Humean conven-
tionalism: systems of property emerge because of their usefulness to human communities, but 
the exact form they take is shaped and influenced by heuristics and biases that are part of our 
natural and biological inheritance.  Those psychological dispositions plausibly inform our intu-
itive judgments about our own and others’ entitlements in ways that lawmakers would be ill-
advised to ignore. 
!
II. WHAT IS PROPERTY? 
Much philosophical argument about property rights concentrates on their justification, 
but, by way of background, we need to be clear about what they actually are.   When a person 6
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!has a property right in something — whether an object, a piece of land, or something more ab-
stract —he or she has at least a minimal set of rights with respect to that thing. The set includes 
the right to use and control the thing that is property and the right to grant or refuse permission 
to others to use and control it. Such rights are not necessarily absolute, since it is easy to imag-
ine circumstances in which the rights of a property owner can and should be overridden, or in 
which such rights do not extend to using the object in certain harmful ways. But the having of 
such rights, imposing prima facie duties on others, is at the core of what we mean by property. 
While it is easy to think of the ownership relation as being a relation between a person (the 
owner) and what is owned (his or her property), and even to think of the fact of being some-
one’s property as an attribute of the owned thing, property is actually a social relation between 
persons concerning things. Property rights assign permissions and duties to people with respect 
to objects. When people understand that an object is someone’s property, they usually grasp, in 
virtue of grasping the concept, what their own duties are understood to be toward the owner and 
the object. This is so even in cases when people are of a mind, as thieves are, to reject or ignore 
those duties. 
To these basic rights of control and permission or exclusion we can add others, perhaps 
less central to the core notion but usually important, such as rights to transfer ownership of the 
object. Such rights are arguably less central because a property owner can lack them; yet their 
control and exclusion rights still continue to structure the choices available to others. The owner 
of an English aristocratic estate who is bound to pass it on to the next generation and may not 
sell, or the owner of a theater ticket marked “nontransferable,” still have a property in the ob-
jects they own for most practical purposes. 
Even where people grasp the basic idea of property, there can be considerable dis-
agreement about closely related questions. For example, people can disagree about the kinds of 
thing that can be owned. Notoriously, in some cultures it is possible to own people. People may 
disagree about whether it is morally possible to own some natural objects. There is also little 
consensus about intellectual property and about the circumstances under which and limits to 
when an idea, an invention, or a work of art can be someone’s property. In some of these cases 
we do need to settle matters explicitly by law, a point to which I return in the final section. 
 4
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III. THE INTERESTS SERVED BY PROPERTY !
There are many philosophical accounts of the interests served by property. Some of 
these interests are individual, others collective. I will not attempt a comprehensive survey,   but 7
it is worth noting some of the principal justifications, many of which complement rather than 
compete with one another. Some of these provide general reasons why property is a good insti-
tution to have. For example, for Kant property rights secure for individuals a sphere of external 
freedom, within which they can pursue their personal plans and projects without needing the 
permission of others. For Hegel, a sphere of ownership can provide people with the material to 
develop and express their individual personality. I assume that these are valuable possibilities 
and that property rights thereby serve important human interests. As David Hume noticed, the 
existence of a system of property rights also serves mutual and collective interests. By assigning 
control over assets and thereby providing people with security and foreseeability, stable systems 
of property enable people to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways; this helps the society of 
which they are a part become richer and do better than if energy were wasted on conflicts over 
resources and people were reluctant to invest their efforts in productive ventures.   8
There are also considerations that justify special connections between individuals and 
bits of the world, such as objects, animals, land, and so on. These connections give (defeasible) 
reasons why particular people should own particular things. Sometimes these special connec-
tions are established by acts of initial acquisition that reflect purposive activity by people to-
wards the world (Locke), including possession, habituation, and transformation of previously 
commonly owned or unowned things; sometimes they are established by acts of transfer from 
owners to other people. Usually these acts of property acquisition come with qualifications. 
Standardly, when property rights would threaten the vital interests of third parties, acts of acqui-
sition may turn out to be impermissible. Such limits are suggested by devices such as Locke’s 
proviso on acquisition, according to which an initial appropriator must leave enough and as 
good for others. As I shall suggest below, the disposition to assign ownership rights to people 
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!who have, as creators or initial possessors, a strong purposive connection to an object or territo-
ry may have deep roots in our human nature. 
IV. ARGUMENTS THAT PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE STATE-DEPENDENT !
In modern discussions of property acquisition a standard contrast is drawn between natur-
al rights and conventionalist accounts. Though conventionalism does not strictly entail that 
property depends on states and legal systems, that conflation is often made. In debates concern-
ing taxation, liberal egalitarians, such as Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy are wont to claim 
that the perception that individuals often have that states in taxing them are taking away their 
property reflects a confusion about the very nature of property and a commitment to a false nat-
ural rights conception of what property rights are.   According to this view, when people believe 9
that the state is taking away their property, they are failing to grasp the intrinsically convention-
al nature of property rights and that their title to their property was already subject to a modifi-
cation by lawmakers that made it liable to taxation. On this view, taxation leads to no transfer of 
property from a private owner to the state, since the state merely applies the right it had all 
along to a portion of the assets. Accordingly, no question of injustice (let alone anything “on a 
par with forced labor”)   can occur, and to suppose that it does just reflects the conceptual con10 -
fusion of those who disagree. In this section I subject these claims to scrutiny before going on in 
the rest of the essay to engage with recent scientific findings that relate to our capacity to use 
and navigate property systems. 
The view that property rights are necessarily the creation of the state as sovereign power 
is expressed by Hobbes, who in his Leviathan explained that “…where there is no coerceive 
Power erected, that is, where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having 
Right to all things . . . .”   According to Hobbes, without a sovereign there can be no property, 11
but only possession, which lasts as long as a person is physically able to maintain it. Without an 
assurance that his or her own holdings will be recognized and respected by others, nobody has a 
good reason to recognize and respect the possessions of others. Once a sovereign power is in 
place, that power has the authority simply to decide on whatever rules of property seem right, 
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and to alter those rules at will. The view that sovereigns have such an authority to set property 
rights was also endorsed by both Bentham and other utilitarians — who in any case thought that 
all talk of innate rights was nonsense — and, perhaps more surprisingly by Immanuel Kant. 
Since the view that property rights are intrinsically state-dependent is, today, asserted 
most strongly by liberal egalitarian philosophers influenced by Kant, I shall here concentrate on 
his treatment of the issue.   In addition to the assurance argument, Kant also advanced two fur12 -
ther considerations. First, he argued that without a sovereign to set a framework of property law 
and to adjudicate disputes, property holdings must inevitably suffer from a fatal indeterminacy 
about who owns what. Second, noticing the truth that property is most basically not a relation 
between persons and things but among persons concerning things, he claimed that a sovereign 
authority was a necessary condition for one person to be under a duty with respect to the hold-
ings of others. Only a set of rules that could be justified from the perspective of everyone could 
place individuals under a duty to respect such holdings. The alternative, in which individuals 
claim the right to exclude others unilaterally, amounts, claimed Kant, not to a genuine assertion 
of right but rather of power. 
Kant took himself to have provided an a priori demonstration of the conceptual depen-
dence of property on the state. On his view, the state is a necessary condition for the possibility 
for property: without the state, particularly in its legislative and adjudicative roles, there simply 
can be no such thing as property. Each of these three Kantian reasons for rejecting the very idea 
of property rights that are independent of the state and the legal system is, however, open to ob-
jection.  In each case the argument can be met by showing that the relevant condition can be 
satisfied to a sufficient degree in the absence of the state. This is not to deny that states might be 
very useful or desirable ways of satisfying these conditions, but it is to deny that they are neces-
sary for this.  
The indeterminacy argument claims that without a state to decide on property rights, it 
will prove practically impossible to determine where one person’s property ends and another’s 
begins, making conflict inevitable. A philosophical claim that property rights require determina-
cy is therefore combined with an empirical one that in the absence of the state a determinacy 
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!threshold will not be surmounted. This argument appears to have more plausibility than it actu-
ally does because of the possibility of raising skeptical doubts about the spatial and temporal 
extent of a holding. Sometimes these doubts represent real difficulties, but often they are 
philosophers’ worries, contrived for the sake of making an in-principle objection but having lit-
tle bearing on actual practice. Property rights, however, serve a practical function, giving people 
the possibility of security and predictability with respect to external objects. While some possi-
ble objects of ownership — particularly resources like land or fisheries — may have boundaries 
that are intrinsically indeterminate, other objects have clearer edges. The precise point at which 
a field at the edge of a village ends may be vague, but other objects such as a hunter’s spear, a 
ball, or a cow are much more clearly delineated. Vagueness as to boundaries, even when it ex-
ists, may not prove a great practical issue because it may not correspond to any practical ques-
tion where people have competing interests. Moreover, merely theoretical questions, such as 
indeterminacies about how far ownership extends vertically above and below a plot of land will 
not impinge on the use and application of property rights in societies without aircraft and which 
do not extract minerals from below the soil. None of this is to say that property disputes could 
not and would not arise in stateless societies, but that is not the worry here. The point is that 
there is no reason to think that on a reasonable construal of what is practically required for de-
terminacy, indeterminacy problems are so pervasive that stateless societies could not and would 
not employ notions of mine and thine on the grounds that people just couldn’t tell which was 
which. 
The unilateralism argument is that property, in order to be legitimate, needs to be justified 
from everyone’s point of view: in Kant’s terminology, property has to be the expression of an 
“omnilateral will.”  This is a philosophical argument for a necessary condition on legitimate 
property, but the condition is probably so demanding as to subvert the practical function of the 
institution by ensuring that no actual systems of property meet it. Kant’s thought is that central 
to the idea of property is the right to exclude and that this involves placing others under a cor-
relative duty of noninterference. This can appear mysterious: where does this right to impose a 
duty on others and thereby to subject them to your will come from, and what reason do others 
have to accept it?  But perhaps we should resist framing the issue like this. Rather, we should 
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ask whether the action of another person on the world with respect to particular objects can ever 
give us a reason to recognize them as having a privileged status concerning those objects. One 
sort of reason might flow from seeing that their relation to those objects expresses certain hu-
man interests that we also share: perhaps interests in security, stability, selfhood, personality and 
so on. This is not to deny that when our own most basic interests are threatened by exclusion, 
we might find that one set of reasons outweighs or silences another. 
In any case, the requirement that for property to be possible, all must be subject to legisla-
tion from the perspective of everyone looks far too demanding to be realistic. To see this, we 
can ask whether existing property rights are justified from such a perspective. Existing property 
rights are guaranteed by legislation passed by states that are rather imperfect, that fail to repre-
sent the interests of all of their citizens and that impose unilateral exclusion on many outsiders 
(such as would-be immigrants). The idea that states actually express an “omnilateral will” is a 
transparent fiction. Kantians sometimes argue that we should engage with states with the pre-
sumption that they incarnate such a will, because that is a prerequisite for equal freedom, non-
domination, justice, and property. But the circularity here is manifest: property is only legiti-
mate if it issues from an omnilateral will; we should accept state legislation as representing such 
a will because doing so is a condition of property’s legitimacy. A realistic view of states sug-
gests, instead, a dilemma: since no state expressing an omnilateral will exists, either property 
can be legitimate without depending on such a will, or, alternatively, there is no legitimate prop-
erty in the world. Since the latter conclusion looks unpalatable, it seems plausible that omnilat-
eralism is not necessary for legitimate property. 
It might be objected that the dilemma I just posed for the proponent of the omnilateral 
will expresses matters in too binary a manner. We might instead conceive of states expressing 
such a perspective to a greater or lesser degree and of property rights guaranteed by a state as 
partaking of that legitimacy to a corresponding degree. The thought would be that while existing 
states may not fully express an omnilateral will they approximate one and — to the extent to 
which they do — people subject to their authority have reasons to consider themselves subject 
to its authority with respect to one another’s rights, including property rights. There are difficul-
ties with such a move: for example, the will that is general with respect to the citizens of the 
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!state concerned still remains particular in relation to the rest of the world, so there is an unre-
solved question about whether those outsiders (such as would-be immigrants) have good reason 
to respect such property rights. Another worry would be that an argument that makes the legiti-
macy of property a function of state legitimacy requires us to accord less moral security of ten-
ure to otherwise identically placed individual owners as a result of the way political power is 
exercized in their country.  But the key point to make is that Kant’s claim is that an omnilateral 
will is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of any property. I can deny such a claim while 
conceding that an imperfectly realized collective will can be a desideratum for a system of 
property rights and that it can add to the legitimacy and determinacy of such a system and might 
even be necessary for some forms of property.  I can also agree that acts of appropriation need to 
take account of the legitimate interests of third parties and are subject to revision in the light of 
those interests: but a condition such as some version of a Lockean proviso will meet that test in 
the absence of a state. All that I need here is to block the idea that a collective will expressed by 
a state is always a necessary condition: and even a single case where it is plausible to suppose 
that third parties are placed under a duty by an act of appropriation would achieve that. 
This leaves us with the assurance argument, the conjunction of the philosophical claim 
that people lack a reason to treat the property claims of others as authoritative unless they have a 
guarantee that their own similar claims will also be respected with the empirical claim that the 
state is necessary for such a guarantee. Someone might press a case for such an assurance condi-
tion being necessary for the mutual recognition of property rights, by suggesting that in circum-
stances of great uncertainty and insecurity, where others are not refraining from seizing my pos-
sessions, it would be irrational for me to abstain from those of others. Perhaps so. But we can 
distinguish between requiring assurance as a precondition to recognizing the rights of others and 
being willing to recognize such rights in the case where one’s own rights are not recognized. 
There is a big difference between assuming the worst and acting accordingly, and acting similar-
ly when the worst actually obtains. The latter can be justified when the former is not: shooting 
in self-defense is very different from shooting first and asking questions later. The assurance 
condition as interpreted by Kant (following Hobbes) is therefore implausibly demanding and if 
taken seriously would generate an unwarranted general propensity to trigger-happiness.  
 10
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The assurance argument is also undermined by the empirical claim that only the state can 
satisfy it. If people could be assured to the required degree — whatever that degree is — in the 
absence of the state, then the claim that property is only possible under a state is undermined. In 
fact, it turns out that even Hobbes sometimes suggests that the state of nature will contain 
smaller societies — set up for mutual defense — in which people will keep their agreements 
and, presumably, respect one another’s holdings.   This suggests that even on quite a pessimistic 13
view of human nature, people can achieve a sufficient level of assurance in the absence of the 
state to find it rational to treat one another’s putative property rights as giving them reason to 
desist from taking, and that therefore property rights can exist independently of states and legal 
systems. 
V. SUPERSEDING THE NATURAL-SOCIAL DIVIDE !
I have spent some time in the previous section countering arguments from Kant that assert that 
the state is necessary for the existence of property. My principal justification for giving these 
arguments such attention is that they continue to be influential. One thing that is noteworthy 
about them, though, is their antiquity. That is no bad thing in itself: a good argument is a good 
argument whenever it is made. But insofar as arguments often depend on factual premises that 
are superseded by later scientific information or arise within a worldview that is similarly out-
moded, we ought to at least look to see whether we should take a different view of matters in 
the light of subsequent discoveries. Reliance on notions inherited from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and then recycled as the common stock of ideas through the canon is a 
problem with political philosophy quite generally, and debates on property are no exception.    14
Standardly, debates over property involve a contrast between a natural law account of 
property, filtered through Locke, and the conventionalist “response” to that account, given in its 
most sophisticated form by Kant. There is much to learn from the ways in which Locke and 
Kant discussed the difficulties of acquisition, but the contrast depends in part on distinctions 
between natural and social that now look questionable. Take, for example, the issue of natural 
law. As conceived of in the seventeenth century, this is closely bound up with theological as-
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!sumptions, particularly about the will of God, what God’s intentions are for his children, and so 
forth. Although we can try to secularize such ideas by emphasizing the rational aspect to natural 
law as opposed to its divine side, the idea that God has planted in us a faculty of moral intuition 
still lurks. On the other side of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century argument is a view that 
understands human beings as essentially individualistic and needing somehow to use artifice to 
overcome the defects of our natural condition by choice and convention. According to this con-
trast, property must be either part of God’s plan, programmed into a design that we have a filial 
duty to implement, or just one of the artificial structures that we must create ex nihilo. On such 
a picture the normativity of property — the reason we should take property rights to have prac-
tical authority for us — is either a consequence of God’s command, which He has given us the 
ability to discern, or is something mysterious, problematic, and perhaps arbitrary: the product of 
choice, will, desire, or projection. 
Contrast this with a modern post-Darwin picture of human beings. God has gone miss-
ing (or is dead!) and the natural–social distinction cannot be conceived of as mapping onto a 
natural–artificial one, since part of our nature just is to be a social species like our closest pri-
mate relatives. Though many of our social institutions are conventional and exhibit a bewilder-
ing degree of variation historically and culturally, they still depend on drives, capacities, and 
abilities that we possess naturally.  The foremost example of this is language. Language is both 
highly conventional — witness the degree of variation among languages and the arbitrariness of 
such things as the association between words and their referents — and a human universal that 
we possess by nature,   perhaps with its basis in a Chomskyan universal grammar, perhaps pig15 -
gybacking on a capacity for gestural communication that we have inherited from primate ances-
tors.   16
The normativity of language poses fewer problems than the normativity of ethics, at 
least in the sense that people engaged in communication who want to understand and make 
themselves understood normally have little incentive to deviate from locally shared norms. It is 
therefore relatively easy to give an account of the motive to adhere to such norms in terms of 
self-interest. Adherence to norms of morality and justice — including norms of property — is 
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much harder to explain and so it can come to seem mysterious that there can even be such 
norms and institutions in the absence of some external power — such as Hobbes’s sovereign — 
that guarantees compliance. 
It is likely, however, that compliance with the norms of language is just one instance of 
a more general human predisposition to comply with rules and norms. Human beings are a high-
ly collaborative species. Michael Tomasello’s work shows how very small children exhibit 
prosocial behaviors, and incline to help, inform, and share spontaneously rather than out of any 
calculation of private advantage. Later, these prosocial inclinations are harnessed by culture and 
by social institutions, which exploit emotions such as guilt and shame and the desire of individ-
uals to create a good impression with their peers, in order to secure compliance and cooperation. 
Unlike other species, humans exhibit a capacity to identify with others, and to internalize collec-
tive goals and projects. Other great apes, it turns out, have the capacity to collaborate in the way 
suggested by rational-actor models: faced with some objective, such as getting some food, they 
can work with one another instrumentally to gain a reward, and this requires some ability to 
comprehend the actions and motives of their partners. What humans can do is far more sophisti-
cated. We can engage in sophisticated and rule-structured collaborative activities with individu-
als occupying functionally distinct but complementary roles. To do this successfully requires not 
only a calculation of private advantage, but also the capacity to adopt the perspective of the 
scheme as a whole, to internalize it as a joint goal, and to understand the perspective of others 
toward that shared goal, including their capacity to understand what others are doing and why. 
We-intentionality in humans is part of our basic cooperative repertoire.   17
One way of putting this point is to return to Kant's claim that norms, including exclusionary 
rights, need to be justified from the perspective of everyone. Kant thought that this could only 
be done via the creation of an artificial institution. But if human beings are naturally disposed to 
have both an individual and a group-level perspective on joint cooperative ventures, then adopt-
ing and sharing the perspective of everyone (at least all members of the group) may be easier 
than Kant thought. This is not to deny that there is conflict between individual and collective 
interest such that cheaters and free-riders can be a problem, since taking the group perspective 
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!does not entail being motivated to act on it. But groups may be quite good at detecting and pun-
ishing free-riders in practice, and biologically-grounded processes of socialization may result in 
individuals experiencing powerful internal obstacles that mitigate their inclinations to oppor-
tunism such as feelings of shame (with their external correlate, the human-specific disposition 
to blush).   18
VI. OUR NATURAL CAPACITIES WITH RESPECT TO PROPERTY !
One way to find out whether property rights can exist independently of the state and the legal 
system is to search for evidence that they actually do exist independently. For example, we can 
look to see whether other species have and make use of property; we can look at evidence from 
social anthropology concerning stateless societies; we can look at the informal use of property 
concepts among people who live in states to see whether that use is an application of the official 
account of property rights or has a life independent of the state;   and we can look at the acqui19 -
sition and use of property concepts among children to see whether this is merely the transmis-
sion of a state-based idea or has an autonomous life.  
Recent experimental work by psychologists, particularly but not exclusively, with children, pro-
vides us with some interesting evidence, evidence that has hitherto received little attention from 
philosophers and political theorists interested in property. Much of this section therefore con-
centrates on reporting this work and trying to tease out some of its implications for the philo-
sophical debate. But before doing so, I want to say something about property-rights and non-
human species, because this can provide some background, albeit somewhat speculative, against 
which to think about property in humans. 
A. Property in nonhuman animals 
The very idea of property rights among nonhuman animals would appear to be absurd, 
for rather obvious reasons. These are that property is normative: it involves the application of 
rules by conscious agents who make judgments about the application of those rules to particular 
cases and take those rules and judgments to provide them with reasons for action. Nietzsche 
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famously says in the second essay of the Genealogy of Morals, that nature has set itself the 
paradoxical task of breeding an animal with the ability to make promises.   Only such a crea20 -
ture, a mysterious apparition against a landscape of mere instinct, could have even the possibili-
ty of using the property concept. Yet perhaps this dismissal of animal property is too quick. To 
be sure, most animals do not act for reasons, although there is growing evidence that some of 
our closest relatives are able to represent to themselves the intentions of their fellows and to use 
those representations as elements in their own deliberation.   However, many animal species do 21
exhibit behavioral patterns with respect to external objects and territory that resemble behaviors 
that humans engage in when using the property concept. Even though such behaviors are not 
instances of the use of that concept, it often seems natural to us to speak of them as if they are. It 
could very well be that — just as our ability to use language (with its rules and norms) rests 
upon and develops out of more primitive communicative capacities — so too our ability trans-
parently and effortlessly to navigate a social world that is constituted in large part by property 
norms has a natural basis. 
Some work in evolutionary biology would seem to bear this out. Scientists have argued 
that there may be a survival advantage to the encoding of specific rules governing the allocation 
of resources. This is because conflict over resources threatens to result in damage to the fighting 
individuals and thereby decreases the probability that they will pass on their genes. Such rules 
may include deferring to larger and more powerful opponents but also other behaviors such as 
the recognition of first occupancy. In this latter case, those in first possession may fight longer 
and harder to hang on to what is theirs even against much stronger opponents. This endowment 
effect means that conspecifics will be reluctant to challenge first occupiers and will seek alter-
native resources if they can. In humans, the well-documented phenomenon of loss-aversion, the 
tendency that people have to value what they are in possession of more highly than some func-
tional equivalent and to hold on to that possession even when it appears not to be rational to do 
so may have a similar evolutionary basis. What is distinctive in humans is the willingness not 
only of possessors to fight hard for what they have, but of third parties to engage in norm en-
forcement against invaders. In the animal kingdom, the only evidence for third-party action of 
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!this kind is among ravens.   Encoded prudence, as it were, may provide a motive for a reluc22 -
tance to deprive possessors of their resources, but there also seems to be evidence in some of 
our close primate relatives of begging and sharing behaviors that suggest something closer to a 
norm of respect for possession.   23
B Psychological evidence regarding humans 
Because property plays such an important role in structuring our lives and yet also 
seems mysterious given that it is not an observable property of objects, the acquisition, under-
standing, and use of this concept raises interesting psychological issues. How do people acquire 
the concept and when? How do they make judgments about who owns what, or about whether a 
thing can be owned at all? How is property implicated in other social relationships and in con-
flict? Why does an abstract concept like property feature centrally in mental illnesses such as 
hoarding and kleptomania? In one recent survey, researchers identified twenty-one different rea-
sons why psychologists should take seriously the psychological bases of ownership.   To sum24 -
marize some of the findings of this research to date: children pick up the property concept dur-
ing the preschool years and even quite young infants display some competence with the idea; 
acquisition of the concept does not seem to be as a result of explicit teaching; children’s de-
ployment of property norms is often not reinforced and sometimes undermined by adults, yet 
their attachment to those norms remains robust; and children and adults apply heuristics to 
judge property ownership that bear a strong resemblance to principles of acquisition from the 
natural rights tradition such as “first possession” and “labor mixing.” 
Acquisition of the property concept proceeds by stages, starting perhaps as early as nine 
months, when children start to establish triadic relationships involving themselves, another per-
son, and objects in the surrounding environment.   With the advent of speech comes the use of 25
possessive phrases occurring, perhaps unsurprisingly, when both person and object are present 
to the child. Before the end of the second year, children can report on the association between a 
person and the object even in the absence of immediate visual information. At eighteen months, 
children have a clear sense of themselves as proprietors of objects, asserting ownership by the 
use of expressions like “Mine!”   By the age of thirty months verbal information alone can es26 -
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tablish the association.   At the age of about three, children have started to understand the no27 -
tion that objects they possess might be shared or exchanged with others, though this understand-
ing is imperfect. By the age of five 
. . . children understand and experience possession at a meta-conceptual level. They now 
factor what others might feel or think when trading with them. Children not only possess 
something that they construe as potentially tradable, hence alienable . . . but also that a 
possession as a property can be given or exchanged based on what other people want or 
need. They also develop a sense of fairness they assume is shared with others and should 
rule exchanges.   28
!
In other words, the acquisition of the property concept is part and parcel of entry into the moral 
universe, and our coming to have a sense of others as equals, as participants, each with their 
own point of view and different needs and wants. 
Development of the property concept is a gradual thing, though. Until the age of five, 
children may have grasped the concept of acquisition and some of the rights of permission and 
exclusion that go with it, but still struggle somewhat with the idea of permanent legitimate 
transfer in cases, such as gift-giving, where the first-possession heuristic is in conflict with the 
right of transfer. They may therefore wrongly believe that the recipient of the gift is not its right-
ful owner.   Children struggle with some other aspects of the ownership relation until even later, 29
for example, up until the age of eight they seem to have difficulty grasping that a sleeping per-
son can be the owner of something.   30
In trying to judge who is the owner of an object such as a toy, children seem to employ 
a heuristic of first possession, guessing that whomever they first observe in possession of the 
object is probably the owner.   Thereafter, they are able to track the object through the sequen31 -
tial possession of various persons, such as other children playing with a ball, while maintaining 
the judgment that the first possessor is the probable owner. That this cue dominates over other 
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!information is a remarkable fact, after all, an observer may know nothing of the history of an 
object before they first see it, so it might seem more rational to use the totality of available in-
formation to judge ownership rather than exhibiting a bias toward first possession. Nevertheless, 
when children are told stories containing additional information, first possession wins out. So, 
for example, when children are shown boys playing with toys that gender stereotypes associate 
with girls (and vice versa) and later the same toy is shown in the possession of the gender it is 
usually identified with, children continue to attribute ownership to the first possessor contrary to 
the gender stereotype. Similar results obtain for duration of play: even when the second posses-
sor of a toy plays with it for much longer than the first possessor, child observers are apt to 
judge that the first possessor is the owner. There are also some indications that when creative 
labor is invested in an object, children are inclined to see that as generating a new ownership 
relation to the object.   32
Studies involving adults also bear out the strength of the first-possession heuristic. A 
well-known case in American jurisprudence is Pierson v. Post (1805).   Post was in pursuit of a 33
fox, but Pierson intercepted and killed the animal. Post then brought an action against Pierson 
claiming the fox as his property, and was initially successful. However, on appeal to the 
Supreme Court of New York, the case was decided in favor of the first pursuer and not the pos-
sessor. The psychologists Ori Friedman and Karen Neary, who have tested whether children and 
adults tend to agree with the judgment (they do) reports that the principle is widely and cross-
culturally applied and cites examples including Eskimo hunting practices, the Institutes of Jus-
tinian and the Jewish Mishnah (200AD).    Widespread agreement on the principle, in individu34 -
als of different ages, cultures and across historical periods suggests a direction of fit: it is not the 
judgments of individuals that conform to positive law but rather the law that bends itself to a 
principle of initial acquisition that people find naturally salient. Both of the prominent ways of 
gaining initial attachment to an object — first possession and labor mixing — are, of course, 
prominent in classic natural rights accounts of property ownership. 
One counter-hypothesis in some of these cases involving children would be that they are simply 
learning from adults the rules that are present in the wider society. While it is hard to get con-
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clusive evidence either way, it is worth noting that adults often use different principles in judg-
ing ownership and that they are often inclined not to reinforce but to undermine children’s 
judgments about ownership and fairness.  An example of different principles being in play is 
that adults are more reluctant than children to let the creative labor of an artist override the prior 
ownership of an artist’s materials (such as a piece of clay).   Children’s views are undermined 35
when their quasi-Lockean judgments about their rights over possessions are overridden by par-
ents whose Hobbesian interest is in conflict resolution among siblings and peers rather than in 
upholding entitlement norms.  . In both of these cases, adult judgments and interventions would 36
tend to inhibit rather than reinforce social learning of norms governing property. In this connec-
tion, one set of researchers observed that “[i]f property rights exist because society grants and 
upholds such rights then it is the society of children rather than that of parents that teaches chil-
dren about ownership.”   37
VII. NATURALISM, NORMATIVITY, AND PROPERTY !
One way of understanding these studies is to conclude that the concept of property, to-
gether with some of the normative baggage that goes with it, is an essential component of our 
moral repertoire. When children acquire the ability to navigate the invisible world of property, 
permissions, exclusions, and so on, they enter the moral universe. Many aspects of that universe 
are culturally variable, but there may also be dispositions that are more deeply ingrained and 
which inform our understanding of property and provide a certain amount of content. For ex-
ample, the endowment effect, a seemingly irrational bias and perhaps a product of natural selec-
tion, helps to underpin our early attachment of objects and get the developmental process start-
ed, and heuristics like first possession may predispose communities to favor some rules over 
others. But there is nevertheless a worry about the intrusion of these naturalistic elements into 
our understanding of property. 
If our moral capacities, including our capacities for justice and, hence, our capacity to 
make and adhere to conventions regarding property, have a biological basis in that they have 
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!been naturally selected for, that raises a problem about their normativity, about their supposed 
authority over us. It is one thing to have a positive scientific account of how humans behave; it 
is quite another to claim that they ought to behave in particular ways. And the mere fact that 
people do treat certain commands or prohibitions as having authority for them falls short of an 
argument that they have reason to do so. Deploying evidence from animal behavior, from state-
less societies, and from the psychological development of children, then, might be thought to be 
irrelevant to the task at hand. Hobbes and Kant, for example, took themselves to provide not an 
anthropological theory about justice, property, the state, and so on, but rather a theory about the 
good reasons that people ought to take as having authority over them.  
One possible reply to these concerns is somewhat ad hominem. It is to notice that many 
of these supposedly normative theories depend upon factual premises about human nature, 
about our drives and inclinations. Hobbes's account of human nature and the problem of coop-
eration would be a good example of this, with its assertion of individualism, of our primitive 
lusts for resources and status, and our fearful and suspicious character. A slightly different point 
would be to notice that many of the intuitive judgments that we are inclined to make and which 
philosophers rely upon as primitive normative inputs to their theories, for example in Locke's 
parables of labor-mixing, may have their origin in evolutionarily selected biases and heuristics. 
(Though to discover this is potentially to impugn the normative authority of those judgments 
and intuitions.) 
The evolutionary explanation of the capacities and dispositions that sustain our ability 
to make and conform to rules (including rules of justice and property) is that having such capac-
ities gave a selective advantage to our ancestors in the circumstances in which our species 
emerged. The conferring of such a selective advantage is arguably not a morally valuable goal 
in itself, but even if it were, the fact that some trait increased the probability of distant ancestors 
passing on their genes in the past (under very different circumstances) could not feature in an 
argument recommending that trait now.  
However, all is not lost. One possible line of defense is consequentialist. That a disposi-
tion tends to increase inclusive fitness may not be a reason to favor it, but that it tends to in-
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crease human well-being would be, so long as we grant that human well-being is a value that 
can feature in an argument with normative force. The traits that make extensive human coopera-
tion possible are very plausibly congenial to our well-being as well as to our inclusive fitness; 
moreover, that connection is not merely accidental, since enabling us to avoid premature death 
from accidents, disease, or at the hands of predators is good both experientially and in terms of 
passing on our genes.    More troubling are the many cases in which our natural dispositions 38
contradict what are normally taken to be the demands of morality. But here too there are things 
that we can say. There are two different sorts of tension at work: first between egoism and a 
more impersonal perspective; second between the collective standpoint of the group and the 
demands of an impartial moral code. The evidence suggests that nature has reduced the first ten-
sion, perhaps at the expense of exacerbating the second. Though human beings are of course 
tempted to prefer their own good to that of the group, there are strong psychological mecha-
nisms and socialization pressures that also favor cooperation at the group level such that indi-
viduals bear not only the risk of punishment if they free-ride but also strong internal sanctions in 
the form of feelings of shame.   However, the focus here is very much on cooperation with oth39 -
er group members, if necessary at the expense of outsiders and, indeed, group-level willingness 
to cooperate can facilitate such antimoral phenomena as aggressive war against outsiders. 
So natural does not entail the moral, or anything like it. However, although the mecha-
nisms that sustain group-level cooperation — including property norms — did not evolve to 
promote morality and may produce results at odds with it, it seems plausible that these very 
mechanisms at least make genuinely moral action possible, such that any cooperation on a 
wider scale will make use of them. Critical reflection on our evolved dispositions to cooperate 
and on the kinds of beliefs we form as a result, as well as the facts that we also have capacities 
to think logically and  we value consistency, can lead us to extend the scope of our moral con-
cern beyond our immediate group. This does not involve the rejection of our evolved coopera-
tive dispositions but their enlistment in the service of a more comprehensive moral vision. 
VIII. IMPLICATIONS !
 21
!What I have aimed to show here is that the concept of property plays an important part 
in our collective moral life and cooperative projects both prior to and outside of institutions 
such as states and legal systems. Whereas a more statist view of property affords such institu-
tions a free hand to shape property norms at will, on the approach defended here, institutions are 
somewhat constrained by the norms, biases and inclinations — partly biological, partly cultural 
— that are part of our natural endowment.  Crucially,  I resist the move from the claim that 
property is conventional in nature to the conclusion that property norms are simply the creatures 
of legislation.  Rather, the picture offered here turns out to be somewhat Humean (with a Dar-
winian twist).  
Hume thought of systems of property as being conventional in character and rejected 
natural rights accounts. He thought that systems of property rights had evolved over time in 
virtue of their general usefulness and mutually beneficial character. For him, the state comes 
into the picture later in virtue of the need for adjudication and the enforcement of rights that 
have conventional and cultural origins.    The Darwinian twist has two aspects to it. The first is 40
to note that though the rules that structure social life in different human communities exhibit 
great variation, the underlying propensity to make and comply with cooperation-facilitating 
rules and strongly to internalize the desire to conform to them (as well as correlatively the desire 
to punish offenders) likely has a biological basis. Humans have the capacity to take the perspec-
tive of the cooperating group as well as that of their own advantage, and rule-following and re-
active attitudes to rule breaking are part of that endowment. The second is that although particu-
lar rules are conventional, particular rule choice may not be entirely arbitrary but may be shaped 
by heuristics and biases that themselves have a biological origin. Specifically, the phenomena of 
loss-aversion, the first-possessor heuristic, and a propensity to favor a close connection between 
makers and what they make may have such a basis. Insofar as the intuitions and judgments re-
lied upon by natural rights theorists of property have their basis in such propensities, then, we 
also may have effected a partial reconciliation between Hume and John Locke. Just as social 
practices are selected and survive on the grounds of their usefulness (including their possible 
contribution to biological fitness) so the biases and heuristics that underlie rule-choice and favor 
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certain moral intuitions may have their roots in adaptations (or preadaptations) that increased 
the chances of our ancestors passing on their genes. 
 Such a picture leaves rather open questions such as the extent of legitimate property 
rights in the modern world. After all, insofar as our moral propensities have biological origins, 
the circumstances in which they were selected for differ radically from those we now find our-
selves in. Instead of cooperating in small and mobile bands we live in a rather sedentary fash-
ion, are subject to states with millions of citizens, and take part in a global network of coopera-
tion and division of labor. We cannot therefore assume that practices that have evolved to be 
socially beneficial in one set of circumstances will continue to be beneficial in a different set. 
Moreover, many of the forms of property that obtain in the modern world, such as intellectual 
property, rules governing inheritance, and ownership of somewhat abstract entities such as 
stocks and options are largely constituted by the state and its law. So even though the conceptual 
claim that property as such intrinsically depends on the state may not be correct, it turns out to 
be contingently true for a good deal of modern property. 
That might seem to leave the field open for a reassertion of the statist-conventionalist 
claims made by writers such Nagel and Murphy. But we should resist such a conclusion. If the 
inclinations people have to affirm connections between individual agency in creation or posses-
sion and rights of ownership are deeply embedded reactions that are partly constitutive of our 
everyday moral competence, it would be sensible to take account of that when drafting, for ex-
ample, schemes of intellectual property.   And when positive law is too sharply at variance with 41
people’s intuitions about creation and possession, we can expect them to respond with a sense of 
resentment and injustice as their perceived deserts or entitlements are thwarted. The legitimate 
extent of property rights is a matter of legitimate controversy and argument, and intuitions that 
have their origins in much simpler societies than the ones we live in may be unreliable guides in 
a world where markets and the division of labor have global scope. But when people affirm 
their ownership of artifacts that they have created or of land that they and their families have 
invested in, it is a mistake to think that they are simply making a conceptual error about the na-
ture of property. Rather, they are insisting on the importance of pre-institutional attachments and 








!  Frank Snare, “The Concept of Property,” American Philosophical Quarterly 9, no. 2 (1972): 1
201.
!  Such as, most famously, Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 2
1974).
!  A view most strongly expressed recently in Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Own3 -
ership: Taxes and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
!  For example, Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 4
33, no.2 (2005): 113-47.
!  In this essay, I refer most to the work of Michael Tomasello such as his The Origins of Human 5
Communication: The Jean Nicod Lectures (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008) and Why We Cooperate 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), but other work such as Christopher Boehm, Hierarchy in the Forest: 
The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), Christopher 
Boehm, Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 
and Frans de Waal, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2006) fits in the same general space.
!  Here, I take Snare, “The Concept of Property,” as a guide.6
!  For that, Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7
1988) remains unsurpassed.
!   For a recent work arguing the importance of a stable system of property rights for economic 8
growth and development, see Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
!   Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership, 9.9
!   Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 169.10
!   Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Noel Malcolm, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of Thomas 11
Hobbes (1651; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), vol. 2, 220.
!   These three Kantian arguments are set out “The Doctrine of Right” which forms part of The 12
Metaphysics of Morals and is included in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge Edi-
tion of the Works of Immanuel Kant (1797; Cambridge University Press, 1996). I draw on the presenta-
tion of the arguments in Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), ch. 6; See also Allan Gibbard, “Natural Property 
Rights,” Nous 10, no. 1 (1976): 77–86.
!   See Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 224.13
!   Arguably, another way in which such anthropological antiquarianism persists is via the influ14 -
ence and prestige of modern economic theory, to the extent to which it relies on the stock figure of homo 
economicus, the individual rational utility maximizer.  I say, “to the extent” to indicate an awareness that 
modern utility theory is formally indifferent to the content of people’s preference functions, which can be 
egoistic, altruistic, or anything you like. This does not altogether banish the older figure from the tacit 
assumptions made in much economic thinking.
!  Remarkably, Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, 74–75 rely on the 15
conventional nature of language as a parallel with property to bolster their case for the dependence of 
property on positive law, seemingly not noticing that language has its natural side too.
!  This latter view derives from Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication. Tomasello is skep16 -
tical about Chomskyan universal grammar.
!  See Tomasello, Why We Cooperate and particularly Tomasello, Origins of Human Communica17 -
tion, ch. 5. Tomasello in turn draws on work on joint intention pioneered by philosophers such as Mar-
garet Gilbert in her On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
!   On blushing, see Boehm, Moral Origins.18
!  On this, see, for example, Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 19
University Press, 1991).  Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, chapter 5 has interesting discussion 
of how informal property holdings in the United States often predate their formal legal recognition.
!   Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (1887; Cambridge: 20
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 38.
!
 25
!   See Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication, ch. 2.21
!   For discussion see J. E. Stake, “The Property ‘Instinct’,” Philosophical Transactions of the Roy22 -
al Society B: Biological Sciences 359, no. 1451 (2004): 1763. On the evolution of behaviors favoring first 
possession, see John Maynard-Smith and G. A. Parker, “The Logic of Asymmetric Contests,” Animal 
Behaviour 24 (1976): 159-75. The connection to the endowment effect is discussed in Herbert Gintis, The 
Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), ch. 11.
!  As reported by Sarah F. Brosnan, “Property in Nonhuman Primates,” New Directions for Child 23
and Adolescent Development 132 (2011): 9–22.
!   Ori Friedman and Hildy Ross, “Twenty-One Reasons to Care About the Psychological Basis of 24
Ownership,” New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development 132 (2011): 1–8.
!   Philippe Rochat, “Possession and Morality in Early Development,” New Directions for Child 25
and Adolescent Development 132 (2011): 30-1.
!   Ibid., 32.26
!   Peter R. Blake and Paul L. Harris, “Early Representations of Ownership,” New Directions for 27
Child and Adolescent Development 132 (2011): 39–45, drawing also on earlier work by Michael Tomasel-
lo.
!   Rochat, “Possession and Morality in Early Development,” 34.28
!   Peter R. Blake and Paul L. Harris, “Children’s Understanding of Ownership Transfers,” Cogni29 -
tive Development (2009).
!   Nicholaus S. Noles and Frank C. Keil, “Exploring Ownership in a Developmental Context,” 30
New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development 132 (2011): 97
!   Ori Friedman and Karen R. Neary, “Determining Who Owns What: Do Children Infer Owner31 -
ship From First Possession?” Cognition 107, no. 3 (2008): 829–49; Ori Friedman, “First Possession: An 
Assumption Guiding Inferences About Who Owns What,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 15, no. 2 
(2008): 290–95.
!   Patricia Kanngiesser, Nathalia Gjersoe, and Bruce M. Hood, “The Effect of Creative Labor on 32




!   Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805).33
!   Ori Friedman and Karen R. Neary, “First Possession Beyond the Law: Adults’ and Young Chil34 -
dren’s Intuitions About Ownership,” Tulane Law Review, vol. 83 (2009).
!   Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, and Hood, “The Effect of Creative Labor on Property-Ownership Trans35 -
fer by Preschool Children and Adults.”
!   Hildy S. Ross, “Effects of Ownership Rights on Conflicts Between Toddler Peers,” Infancy 36
(March 2012): no–no PLEASE PROVIDE PAGE NUMBERS; Hildy S. Ross, Cheryl Conant, and Marcia 
Vickar, “Property rights and the resolution of social conflict,” New Directions for Child and Adolescent 
Development, 132 (2011): 53–64.
!   Ross, Conant, and Vickar, “Property Rights and the Resolution of Social Conflict.”37
!   For an interesting argument to this effect, see Kevin Brosnan, “Do the Evolutionary Origins of 38
Our Moral Beliefs Undermine Moral Knowledge,” Biology and Philosophy 26, no.1 (2011): 51-64.
!   This is one of the central themes of Boehm, Moral Origins.39
!   See, David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Niddich, 2d ed. 40
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 484–501.
!   It might be thought (for example) that this is exactly what documents such as the Berne Con41 -
vention do, when they recognize the moral rights of authors. 
!
 27
!!
 28
!!
 29
! 30
